Obscenity Laws in England and the United States: A Comparative Analysis by Davidow, Robert P. & O\u27Boyle, Michael
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 2 Article 3
1977
Obscenity Laws in England and the United States:
A Comparative Analysis
Robert P. Davidow
Texas Tech University School of Law
Michael O'Boyle
Queen's University Belfast
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Robert P. Davidow and Michael O'Boyle, Obscenity Laws in England and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 56 Neb. L. Rev. 249
(1977)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol56/iss2/3
By Robert P. Davidow*
and Michael O'Boyle**
Obscenity Laws in England
And the United States:
A Comparative Analysis t
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been 250 years since the offense of "obscene libel" first
was clearly established as a common law offense in England.' It
is, therefore, a particularly appropriate time to compare the devel-
opments in the law of obscenity in the Mother Country with those
in one of her colonial offspring, the United States.
This comparison reveals many similarities as well as differences,
despite the existence of a Bill of Rights in the United States Con-
stitution and the absence of a bill of rights, constitutional or
statutory, in England.2 The similarities include a common judicial
perception of the problem as one involving the need to distinguish
socially valuable materials from those which are corrupting and
worthless. The differences are most pronounced in the procedural
area.
Whether a person is impressed primarily by the similarities or
differences depends, in part, on his attitudes toward the conflict
of values implicit in the obscenity controversy. Is he sympathetic
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.A., Dartmouth College;
J.D., University of Michigan; LL.M., Harvard University.
** Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queen's University of Belfast. LL.B.,
Queen's University of Belfast; LL.M., Harvard University.
t The authors wish to thank Thomas Giovannitti, a third year student
at the School of Law, Texas Tech University, for his help in canvassing
some of the voluminous literature pertaining to obscenity.
1. Dominus Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727).
2. Because obscenity has been treated as an exception to the first and
fourteenth amendment rules prohibiting governmental limitations on
freedom of speech and of the press, it would seem that both American
and English governmental entities are free of constitutional restraints
in the area of obscenity. See notes 6 and 8 infra. Thus, differences
in the laws of the two .nations may be less a result of specific consti-
tutional limitations than a reflection of the general effect of a written
constitution and the interrelationships among various provisions of
that constitution.
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to the obscenity laws' apparent goal to protect and uplift society?
Does he see such laws as a threat to freedom of expression? Does
he believe that the attempted enforcement of such laws conflicts
with well-established due process principles? 3
In light of the foregoing, it is appropriate to warn our readers
that we, the authors, have strong views about laws relating to
obscenity and that inevitably these views have affected our treat-
ment of the subject to some extent. In particular, we believe that
"obscenity" is an inherently vague concept, at least in a pluralistic
society in which there is no consensus about the acceptability of
sex-related materials.
Because of the need to keep the discussion within manageable
limits, this article compares the current laws 4 of obscenity-both
statutory and judge-made-in England and Wales5 with the
United States Supreme Court's delineation of constitutionally per-
missible obscenity laws in the United States. 6 No effort is made
to deal with the specific obscenity laws in the fifty states or with
the many informal restraints upon the display and dissemination
of sex-related materials in England and the United States.1
3. The possible effect of procedural matters on substantive law is of
great interest to some legal philosophers. See. e.g., L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969). A contrary view is at least implicit
in H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
4. For a recent, comprehensive treatment of the legal aspects of ob-
scenity in the United States, see F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
(1976). The appendix following the text discusses some of the histor-
ical development of current law and lists sources for further historical
study.
5. Although it may come as a surprise to many Americans, a good deal
of legislation passed by the Parliament at Westminster is not applica-
ble throughout the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland). For example, the Obscene Publications Act, 1959,
7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, is expressly inapplicable to Scotland and Northern
Ireland. For this reason, the article focuses upon England and Wales.
6. The main constitutional provision involved is the first amendment
which provides, in part, "[c]ongress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ...... This amendment is ap-
plicable to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). For
a brief summary of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
obscenity as an exception to first amendment guarantees, see the
appendix.
7. It is not always easy to draw the distinction between formal and in-
formal limitations upon expression. In the area of American broad-
casting, for example, the constraints imposed by the need for commer-
cial sponsorship are informal, but those imposed by the Federal Com-
munications Commission mix the formal with the informal. See, e.g.,
Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating
OBSCENITY
A. An Outline of Obscenity Law in the United States
The Supreme Court has held that "obscene" materials are not
protected by the first amendment.8  The current definition of
obscenity is found in Miller v. California:9
As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regula-
tion to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That con-
duct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as
written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be
limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
The basic guidelines for the trier of-fact must be: (a) whether
"the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest, . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' 0
The community referred to is undefined, but less than nationwide,
even in the case of the federal obscenity laws."
Several other factors characterize the treatment of obscenity in
the United States. Expert testimony is not required to support the
prosecution's contention that a particular item is obscene.1 2  Al-
Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579 (1975); Note, Morality and
the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory
Standards, 84 HARv. L. REv. 664 (1971). Ostensibly informal restraints
by a state agency may become equivalent to state action. Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-70 (1963). Klein, Film Censor-
ship: the American and British Experience, 12 ViL. L. REV. 419
(1967), contains an example of informal restraint at the municipal
level in the United States. A good discussion of informal censorship
in the United Kingdom is found in P. O'HIcGnGs, CENSORSHIP IN
BRITAIN (1972).
8. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957).
9. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For a generally favorable comment on Miller,
see Clor, Obscenity and the First Amendment: Round Three, 7 Loy.
L. REv. 207 (1974).
10. 413 U.S. at 24.
11. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974), the Supreme
Court said that in a prosecution under the federal obscenity statute,
the community standards to be applied would be the standards of the
judicial district from which the jurors were drawn. Arguably this
was dictum, because the trial judge had instructed the jury that the
standard to be applied was a national standard and the Supreme Court
in effect found that this was harmless error. The statement regarding
local standards was thus unnecessary to the decision of the case. In
Miller, however, the Court upheld the conviction in a case in which
the trial court instructed that the standard was a state-wide standard.
12. "Nor was it error to fail to require 'expert' affirmative evidence that
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though scienter is required for conviction for possession of obscene
material, the defendant need not have a subjective belief that the
materials are obscene, but merely knowledge of the contents of the
material.1 3 One may not be punished constitutionally for posses-
sing obscene matter in the privacy of one's home,1 4 but commer-
cial efforts to make such material available to others are not con-
stitutionally protected. 15 Some material which is not obscene by
adult standards may nevertheless be kept from children.' 6 There
is no requirement that the prosecution obtain a judgment of
obscenity in a civil action before prosecuting a defendant under the
the materials were obscene when the materials themselves were actu-
ally placed in evidence." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 56 (1973). Accord, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)
(dictum). This is, of course, different from the question whether the
defendant has a due process right to introduce such testimony. See
notes 137 and 138 and accompanying text infra.
13. In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the Supreme Court invali-
dated a California statute which had totally eliminated a scienter re-
quirement. In so doing, however, the Court did not indicate whether
something more than mere knowledge of the contents was required.
It has been suggested that the Court ought to announce a constitu-
tional rule whereby the defendant in an obscenity prosecution could
defend on the basis that he "reasonably believed that the material
involved was not obscene." Lockhart, Escape From the Chill of Un-
certainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533,
563 (1975).
In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), however, the
Supreme Court upheld a lower court instruction that the government
had to prove that the defendants "had knowledge of the character of
the materials" and that the defendants' "belief as to the obscenity or
non-obscenity of the material is irrelevant"; in so doing, the Court
stated: "We think the 'knowingly' language of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, and
the instructions given by the District Court in this case satisfied the
constitutional requirements of scienter." Id. at 119-20, 123.
14. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
15. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971);
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1971). Moreover, an
individual may be punished for attempting to import obscene mate-
rials for his own private use. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1973). In the light of these cases, it is not sur-
prising that the Supreme Court also has held that there is no constitu-
tional right to exhibit obscene movies merely because admission to
the movies is restricted to consenting adults. Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1973).
16. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-43 (1968). See Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Children are not the only persons for whom special rules are ap-
plicable; material intended to appeal to the "prurient interest" of "de-
viant" groups can also be proscribed. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966).
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criminal law.1 Indeed, such a procedure is discouraged because
a civil judgment cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution of
someone not a defendant in the civil action, and it is uncertain
whether such a judgment can be used against the original defend-
ant in a subsequent criminal case.' 8 No jury determination is
required in a civil obscenity action.' 9 Prior censorship of obscene
material is permissible if there is a procedure for prompt judicial
review in an action initiated by the censor in which the censor bears
the burden of proving obscenity.20 A warrant is required prior
to seizure of allegedly obscene material 2 ' and a police officer's
conclusory allegations are insufficient to justify issuance of a war-
rant.22 Seizure of all copies of an allegedly obscene book or movie
is apparently not permissible pending judicial determination of
obscenity; presumably the prosecution can only secure one copy and
retain it for evidentiary purposes. 23 Finally, the Supreme Court
has been willing to declare that some materials are not obscene
as a matter of constitutional law. 24
B. An Outline of Obscenity Law in England and Wales
The obscenity laws in England and Wales have developed
through statutes and case law, untempered by the constraints of
a written constitution. The laws vary according to context. Books
and other publications are treated differently than plays.25 These
17. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
18. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976), held that the civil judg-
ment may not be used against a nonparty but left open a number
of questions regarding the possible effect of a civil determination on
a defendant who is a party to a later criminal prosecution. In particu-
lar, the question arises whether one could give effect to the civil deter-
mination in a subsequent criminal trial if at the prior civil trial the
fact finders were only required to find the material obscene under
a preponderance of the evidence test. See id. at 678 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
19. Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
20. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
21. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). For an in-depth analysis
of fourth amendment issues as they pertain to obscenity, see Burnett,
Obscenity: Search and Seizure and the First Amendment, 51 DEN.
L.J. 41 (1974).
22. Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
23. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 490-93 (1973) (dictum).
24. E.g., Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153 (1974); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972). But see Ma-
theny v. Alabama, 425 U.S. 982 (1976); Pendleton v. California, 423
-U.S. 1058 (1976).
25. The Lord Chamberlain was responsible for censoring stage plays un-
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laws, in turn, differ from those relating to the sending of materials
through the post 26 and from those relating to television broad-
casts.27 However, the laws relating to publications generally,
and to the post office, fairly accurately represent the range of
present laws dealing with obscenity.
Local authorities retain considerable power to adopt their own
rules for the treatment of allegedly obscene motion pictures, 28 but
national laws dominate the regulation of publications. The present
standard for publications is contained in the Obscene Publications
Act of 1959,29 as amended by the Obscene Publications Act of 1964.
Material is regarded as obscene under these statutes if it is, taken
as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who
are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see
or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. The words "de-
prave and corrupt" do not refer merely to conduct resulting
from the reading of publications; rather, materials may "tend to
deprave or corrupt" if they cause the reader to have immoral
thoughts.3 0  Also, the term "obscenity" is not restricted to sex-
related materials, but can refer to drug-taking or violence.31
der the Theatres Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 68. This was replaced by
the Theatres Act, 1968, c. 54, which prohibits presentation of obscene
performances of plays, but exempts performances that are justified
as being for the public good in the interest of the arts, literature, or
learning. The magistrate may issue warrants for the police to enter
and inspect. Prosecution requires the consent of the Attorney-General
and premises must be licensed for the public performance of plays.
26. Post Office Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 36.
27. Section 3(1) of the Television Act, 1964, c. 21, which applies only to
independent television and not to the British Broadcasting Company,
establishes a duty on the part of the Television Authority to satisfy
itself that "nothing is included in the programmes which offends
against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite to
crime or lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling." Tele-
vision and sound broadcasting are specifically exempted from the Ob-
scene Publications Act by § 1(3). See note 29 infra; Attorney-General
v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, [1973) Q.B. 629 (C.A.); H.
STREET, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAw 82 (3d ed. 1972).
28. The Cinematographic Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 30, and the Cinemato-
graphic Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 68 (1952), give special
licensing powers which may be used to exclude obscene films. See
generally H. STREET, supra note 27, at 74; Zellick, Films and the Law
of Obscenity, 1971 CmM. L. REV. 126.
29. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 1.
30. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Whyte, [1972] A.C. 849, 863
(Lord Wilberforce).
31. "It [the depravity and corruption] may be to induce erotic desires of
a heterosexual kind or to promote homosexuality or other sexual per-
versions or drug-taking or brutal violence." The Queen v. Calder &
Boyars Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. 151, 172 (C.A. 1968). Also, a special statute
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Under the Obscene Publications Act, it is an affirmative defense
(to be established by the defendant "by the balance of the proba-
bilities," or, in other words, by a preponderance of the- evidence)
that publication is for the public good in that the material "is in the
interest of science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of
general concern.132 Not only is expert testimony not required for
conviction, but also it is not even admissible with respect to the issue
of obscenity; 33 it is admissible, however, with respect to the defense
of public good.3 4 Forfeiture provisions3 5 permit the seizure of all
allegedly obscene material following the securing of a warrant, but
before final determination of obscenity. The writer or publisher
of a publication can intervene in forfeiture proceedings to contest
the claim of obscenity even though the original defendant is only
a bookseller.36
Despite language in the 1959 Act suggesting the inapplicability of
the common law to obscene publications,"T it has been held that
the common law offense of conspiracy to corrupt public morals is
applicable to the publication of obscene materials if more than one
defendant allegedly is involved in the publication.38 In such a
situation, the defense of public good is not available. Apparently,
there is also a common law offense of "conspiracy to outrage
public decency."3 9  Moreover, under the Post Office Act of
deals with publications intended for children which portray violence.
Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act, 1955, 3 & 4
Eliz. 2, c. 28.
32. "The onus was clearly on the appellants to make out their defence
under this section on the balance of probabilities." The Queen v.
Calder & Boyars Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. at 171.
33. The Queen v. Anderson, [1972] 1 Q.B. 304, 313 (C.A. 1971) (dictum).
Expert testimony regarding obscenity, however, can be admitted with
regard to the effect of materials on children. Director of Public Prose-
cutions v. A. & B.C. Chewing Gum Ltd., [1968] 1 Q.B. 159 (1967).
34. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 4(2). But see
The Queen v. Staniforth, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 849 (C.A.), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordon, [1976] 3 All E.R.
775 (H.L.).
35. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 3, as amended by
Obscene Publications Act, 1964, c. 74, §§ 1 (4)-1 (5).
36. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 3 (4).
37. "A person publishing an article shall not be proceeded against for an
offense at common law consisting of the publication of any matter
contained or embodied in the article where it is of the essence of the
offense that the matter is obscene." Id. § 2 (4).
38. Knuller Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435
(1972); Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220
(1961).
39. In Knuller Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435(1972), the House of Lords allowed an appeal with regard to a count
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1953,40 one commits an offense by sending through the mail that
which is either obscene or indecent, the latter being something less
than obscene.4 1 The defense of public good is not available under
the Post Office Act.
In accordance with more general procedural rules, a prosecution
may be instigated by a private individual4 2 who is willing and
financially able to hire a solicitor, who in turn can instruct a bar-
rister in the actual trial. Also, voir dire in obscenity trials, as in
criminal trials generally, is severely limited.4 3 If, under the
Obscene Publications Act of 1959, the prosecution is for a summary
offense before a magistrate (as opposed to an indictable offense
before a jury), the prosecution can sometimes appeal from what
is, in effect, an acquittal by the magistrate.44
II. AREAS OF SIMILARITY
A. Vague Standards
Putting to one side, for the moment, the possibilities in England
of prosecution for sending "indecent" matter through the mail or
for conspiring to corrupt public morals or outrage public decency,
we focus first on the major expressions of each country's law: the
Obscene Publications Act of 1959, and the Miller test.
In England, a Select Committee, organized in 1957 to examine
the law of obscenity and import "greater certainty into the law,"
was unwilling to depart from the 1868 "deprave and corrupt"
formula: "We agree with the opinion of a representative of the
Society of Authors that the result of starting afresh with a com-
pletely new definition would be merely swapping horses and we
of conspiracy to outrage public decency; however, three of the Law
Lords approved of the conspiracy to outrage public decency in princi-
ple, although two of them concluded that they would vote to grant
the appeal because of inadequate jury instructions.
40. Post Office Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 36, § 11 (1) (b).
41. "The words 'indecent or obscene' convey one idea, namely, offending
against the recognised standards of propriety, indecent being at the
lower end of the scale and obscene at the upper end of the scale."
The Queen v. Stanley, [1965] 2 Q.B. 327, 333.
42. Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 &
24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 2; Indictments (Procedure) Rules 1971, STAT. INST.
No. 2084.
43. Although there is a statutory provision for jury challenges, both for
cause and peremptory, there is no formal provision for voir dire. Ju-
ries Act, 1974, c. 23, § 12.
44. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 87
(1952). See, e.g., Director of Public Prosecutions v. Whyte, [1972]
A.C. 849.
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should find ourselves in the courts forced back on the use of
dictionaries and, following the inevitable circle, right back to where
we began."45
The "deprave or corrupt" formulation in the Obscene Publica-
tions Act of 1959, has received little elucidation from the English
courts. In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Whyte,46 Lord Simon
of Glaisdale stated that the purpose of the Act was
on the one hand to enable serious literary, artistic, scientific or
scholarly work to draw on the amplitude of human experience
without fear of allegation that it could conceivably have a harmful
effect on persons other than those to whom it was in truth directed,
and on the other to enable effective action to be taken against the
commercial exploitation of "hard pornography"-obscene articles
without pretention to any literary, artistic, scientific or scholarly
value.47
This is strikingly similar to the language of Miller.
48
It is not clear whether other Law Lords or judges share Lord
Simon's views. What is clear is that this sort of gloss need not
be given in the trial court's jury instructions. Said the Court of
Appeal, Criminal Division, in The Queen v. Calder & Boyars Ltd.: 4,
When, as here, a statute lays down the definition of a word or
phrase in plain English, it is rarely necessary and often unwise
for the judge to attempt to improve on or re-define the definition.
Certainly, in the circumstances of the present case he cannot be
blamed for saying no more than he did about the words "deprave
and corrupt." 50
The trial judge's instructions, thus approved, were:
Those other vifal words "tend to deprave and corrupt" really
mean just what they say. You have heard several efforts to define
them. "Tend" obviously means "have a tendency to" or "be in-
clined to." "Deprave" is defined in some dictionaries, as you have
heard, as "to make morally bad; to pervert or corrupt morally."
... The essence of the matter, you may think, is moral corrup-
tion.51
45. REPORT FROM SELECT COMIMTTEE ON OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS, H.C.
PAPERS 123/1 (1958).
46. [1972] A.C. 849.
47. Id. at 867.
48. One can only speculate upon the possibility that Chief Justice Burger
read the Whyte case before writing the Miller decision, because Whyte
was not cited in the Miller decision or in the briefs filed in that case.
49. [1969] 1 Q.B. 151 (C.A. 1968).
50. Id. at 168.
51. Id. at 167. It has also been said that obscene material is material
that is more than merely "repulsive, filthy, loathsome or lewd." The
Queen v. Anderson, [1972] 1 Q.B. 304, 314 (C.A. 1971).
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Although the courts have devoted little time to the phrase "tend
to deprave or corrupt," the character of the person subject to cor-
ruption or depravity has received considerable attention. In a case,
decided before the 1964 amendment, The Queen v. Clayton,52 the
Court of Criminal Appeal (as it was then called) quashed con-
victions 53 on the ground that, in the case of a sale to a particular
person, the test was whether "the effect of the article in question
on that person was such as to tend to deprave or corrupt him. '
54
In these cases, the persons to whom the allegedly obscene photo-
graphs were sold were policemen who admitted, in effect, that they
were not corrupted. In holding that the submission of no case to
answer (the equivalent of a motion for judgment of acquittal)
should have been accepted, the court said:
This court cannot accept the contention that a photograph may
be inherently so obscene that even an experienced or scientific
viewer must be susceptible to some corruption from its influence.
The degree of inherent obscenity is, of course, very relevant, but
it must be related to the susceptibility of the viewer. Further,
while it is no doubt theoretically possible that a jury could take
the view that even a most experienced officer, despite his protesta-
tions, was susceptible to the influence of the article yet, bearing
in mind the onus and degree of proof in a criminal case, it would,
we think, be unsafe and, therefore, wrong to leave that question
to the jury. Accordingly, this court, though with some reluctance,
has come to the conclusion that the convictions on these two counts
must be quashed. 55
Two subsequent events raise doubts about the extent of the
limitation developed in these cases. First, in 1964, the Obscene
Publications Act was amended to permit prosecution of not only
those who published "obscene" materials (as under the Act of 1959),
but also those who possessed "an obscene article for publication
for gain."5  Thus, it is no longer so necessary to be concerned
with the identity of the persons who actually have purchased an
allegedly obscene item, because publication is not an element of
the offense.
Also, in Director of Public Prosecution v. Whyte, 57 the House
of Lords ruled, in a three-two decision, that it was error for the
magistrates at trial to have acquitted the defendants merely
52. [1963] 1 Q.B. 163 (1962).
53. With one narrow exception, the Court of Appeals must quash a convic-
tion rather than order retrial in a case requiring reversal of the lower
court. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, §§ 2(2), 7, 23.
54. [1963] 1 Q.B. at 167.
55. Id. at 168.
56. Obscene Publications Act, 1964, c. 74, § 1.
57. [19721 A.C. 849.
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because the magistrates had found that the likely readers of the
allegedly obscene materials were "inadequate, pathetic, dirty-
minded men, seeking cheap thrills-addicts to this type of material,
whose morals were already in a state of depravity and corrup-
tion."553 Said Lord Wilberforce, for example:
The Act's purpose is to prevent the depraving and corrupting of
men's minds by certain types of writing: it could never have been
intended to except from the legislative protection a large body of
citizens merely because, in different degrees, they had previously
been exposed, or exposed themselves, to the "obscene" material.
The Act is not merely concerned with the once for all corruption
of the wholly innocent; it equally protects the less innocent from
further corruption, the addict from feeding or increasing his addic-
tion.5 9
In other words, unless those likely to see the allegedly obscene
materials are restricted to either policeman or possibly "medical
men or scientists," the personal characteristics of the ultimate
reader are functionally unimportant, and although the allegedly
obscene material has to have a particular tendency, relating to the
mind of the reader, it can be inferred from the nature of the item
itself. No objective consequences need follow from exposure to
the allegedly prohibited material. 60  Despite protestations to the
contrary on the part of some judges, as a practical matter a fact-
finder is free to deal with the material in the abstract.
Thus, the law in England seems to be very close to that under
Miller, which purports to apply an objective, abstract standard to
allegedly obscene material in the United States. If it is true that
context occasionally can make a difference under Miler-as, for
example, where an "objectively" obscene book is sold only to
doctors who find it useful in their work 61-the same seems to be
58. Id. at 853.
59. Id. at 863.
60. In addition to the language from the opinion of Lord Wilberforce in
Whyte, consider the following language from the opinion of Lord Pear-
son in the same case:
The words "deprave and corrupt" in the statutory defini-
tion refer, in my opinion, to the effect of an article on the
minds of (including the emotions) of the persons who read
or see it. Of course, bad conduct may follow from the cor-
ruption of the mind, but it is not part of the statutory defini-
tion of an obscene article that it must induce bad conduct.
Id. at 864.
61. In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), a pre-Miller deci-
sion, the Supreme Court upheld an obscenity conviction based upon
pandering-that is, the aggressive sale of material which might not
otherwise have been regarded as obscene were it not for the represen-
tations made in the sales process. One of the items involved in this
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true under English law, as illustrated by the requirement that the
material deprave and corrupt those likely to read it.
The defense of public good under the Obscene Publications Act
of 1959 may seem strange to one accustomed to thinking of obscen-
ity in the light of the three-pronged test of Miller. The Act says
that something can deprave or corrupt and yet be justified because
it serves tie interests of "science, literature, art or learning." This
would make sense in the case just alluded to, i.e., where something
which is otherwise corrupting is distributed only to those with
scientific training who can use it in their work. But some may
find it difficult to imagine how something that is genuinely "cor-
rupting and depraving," and is generally distributed, can be said
to be justified in the interest of art or literature. If it is worthy
as art or literature, is it really corrupting? The American approach
avoids the necessity of having a jury decide whether something is
obscene before it has to decide whether it nevertheless has "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," because something
is not, by definition, obscene if it has such value. As a practical
matter, however, the essential vagueness of the notion of obscenity
remains, in part because the words "serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific" on the one hand, and "in the interest of science,
literature, art, or learning," on the other, are themselves so subject
to varying interpretations.
Further, in England the essential vagueness of the "deprave and
corrupt" formula only can be made worse from the point of view
obscenity prosecution, The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Pro-
miscuity, had previously been distributed to a very narrow range of
persons:
Before selling publication rights to petitioners, its author
had printed it privately; she sent circulars to persons whose
names appeared on membership lists of medical and psychi-
atric associations, asserting its value as an adjunct to therapy.
Over 12,000 sales resulted from this solicitation, and a num-
ber of witnesses testified that they found the work useful in
their professional practice. The Government does not seri-
ously contest the claim that the book has worth in such a
controlled, or even neutral, environment.
Id. at 471-72. The implication is that such a limited distribution would
enjoy constitutional protection. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87 (1974), a post-Miller case, the Court upheld a conviction under the
federal obscenity statute. In so doing, it announced that it was going
to apply the principles laid down in Miller even though the conviction
occurred prior to the decision in Miller. As the district court's instruc-
tions at trial were consistent with Ginzburg with respect to the issue
of pandering, and since the Court approved of the district court's han-
dling of the case, one can conclude that the notion of pandering sur-
vives.
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of the jury by judicial pronouncements that it means something
more than "repulsive, filthy, loathesome or lewd," and that articles
may be so disgusting that their effect is aversive rather than
corrupting. 62
The Miller test, involving the requirement of "sexual conduct,"
may seem, at first glance, to be a more precise test than that con-
tained in the English Obscene Publications Act of 1959, as amended.
When one begins to interpret the phrase "ultimate sexual act" or
"lewd exhibition of the genitals," however, one is again confronted
with substantial problems of vagueness. As Mr. Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,63 prob-
lems of uncertainty become especially difficult when the Miller test
is applied to writings, rather than to movies or photographs. What
guidance does one have, for example, in deciding which of the
infinitely variable descriptions of an "ultimate sexual act" are
"patently offensive?" 64
We cannot leave the subject of standards without referring to
other possible prosecutions relating to "obscenity" under English
law. Reference has already been made to prosecutions for mailing
62. In The Queen v. Calder & Boyers Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. 151, 171 (C.A.
1968), for example, the appeal was allowed because the trial judge
failed to charge the jury in accordance with the defense theory that
the book had the effect of so shocking the reader that the reader would
be impelled to eradicate the evils described in the book.
63. 413 U.S. 49, 100 (1973).
64. See Comment, New Prosecutorial Techniques and Continued Judicial
Vagueness: An Argument for Abandoning Obscenity as a Legal Con-
cept, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Ruv. 181 (1973).
Professor Jane Friedman has suggested that the problems of vague-
ness encountered in the application of the Miller test pale in compari-
son with the vagueness problems associated with the enforcement of
zoning restrictions upheld in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50 (1976). Under the ordinance upheld in Young, not only
must a theatre owner decide whether the showing of an "adult" movie,
such as "Midnight Cowboy," constitutes the presentation of material
distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, de-
scribing or relating to "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified
Anatomical Areas," but also he must guess whether the activities of
other theatre owners and bookstore proprietors whose establishments
are within a 1000-foot radius of his theatre similarly constitute the
presentation of such material. The problem is not in the definition
of "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas," since
these are defined in some detail. Rather, the problem is in the mean-
ing of "material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on"
such activities or areas. Remarks of Professor Jane Friedman during
the Law and Arts Committee Program at the Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools in Houston, Texas, December
29, 1976.
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"indecent" matter under the Post Office Act of 1953, and to prose-
cutions for the common law offenses of conspiracy to corrupt pub-
lic morals and conspiracy to outrage public decency. With regard
to the Post Office Act, the only thing that can be said with "cer-
tainty" is that "indecency" is a "milder term"65 than "obscenity,"
but because we do not know what "obscenity" is, it is difficult to
say that the situation is altered practically by the existence of the
category of "indecency."
Analogously, the conspiracy offenses, although requiring proof
of at least two persons acting in concert, theoretically are not
encumbered by the ostensibly restrictive language of the Obscene
Publications Act of 1959, as amended; nevertheless, as that restric-
tive language seemingly provides few if any practical limitations
on prosecutions for obscenity, most juries probably would not alter
their verdicts depending upon the type of charge.66
One "concrete" difference in standards between England and the
United States is that in the United States "obscenity" is restricted
to matters pertaining to sex, whereas in England the concept
extends at least to drugs and violence. The difference in scope will
be discussed below.
B. Lack of Judicial Concern for Fair Notice
The major problem with a vague standard is that it fails to give
notice to potential defendants. In other contexts-for example, in
criminal cases generally and in criminal prosecutions based on con-
duct arguably protected by the first and fourteenth amendments-
the United States Supreme Court frequently has invalidated stat-
utes on the due process ground that defendants were not given fair
notice of the proscribed conduct.6 7 Somewhat surprisingly, the
present majority has found no such problem of fair notice in the
obscenity area. In Miller, Mr. Chief Justice Burger simply assumed
65. The Queen v. Stanley, [1965] 2 Q.B. 237, 333.
66. It must be conceded that in The Queen v. Stanley, [1965] 2 Q.B. 327,
the jury did indeed find the defendant guilty of indecency but not
guilty of obscenity. The question is, however, whether this is likely
to occur frequently, given the vagueness of all the terms used, and
whether the jury would have acquitted the defendants in Stanley if
the only charge had been one of obscenity.
67. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-76 (1974); Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). In situations in which
criminal statutes arguably have impinged on first amendment free-
doms, the Supreme Court has been concerned not only with fair notice
as such, but also with the chilling effect which vague statutes are like-
ly to have on the assertion of first amendment rights. See, e.g., Key-
ishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601-04 (1967).
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that as the majority's guidelines were "concrete," there was no sub-
stantial problem of lack of adequate notice of prohibited conduct:
"We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair
notice to a dealer in such materials that his public commercial activi-
ties may bring prosecution. '68 Nowhere in the majority opinion
does one find a reference to, or discussion of, Mr. Justice Douglas's
suggestion, in dissent, that at the very least no prosecution should
be permitted without a prior civil judicial determination of obscen-
ity which would provide notice that the sale of a particular book
entailed a risk of prosecution. 69
In England the absence of concern with fair notice is perhaps
more understandable, in view of an absence of a Bill of Rights,
if nonetheless regrettable. Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecu-
tions,70 in which the House of Lords resurrected the offense of
"conspiracy to corrupt public morals," is an example of a departure
from the principle of fair notice, in part because the alleged
"conspiracy" consisted of an agreement to publish a directory of
prostitutes-in other words, to assist in the carrying on of what
was then a legal occupation: prostitution."1 The later case of
Knuller Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions"2 in which the rule
of Shaw was reaffirmed, is a further example. Said Lord Morris
of Borth-y-Gest, in reference to the problem of vagueness:
It was suggested and it has been suggested that there is an ele-
ment of uncertainty which attaches to the offence of conspiracy
to corrupt public morals. It is said that the rules of law ought
to be precise so that a person will know the exact consequences
of all his actions and so that he can regulate his conduct with com-
plete assurance. This, however, is not possible under any system
of law. If someone chooses to publish words in regard to another
it may be possible to give advice as to whether the words are capa-
ble of bearing a defamatory meaning but there will be very many
cases in which no certain advice could be given as to whether it
will be held that the words were defamatory and as to whether
he might be held liable to pay damages in a civil action. It may
depend upon the collective view of twelve people on a jury. If
68. 413 U.S. at 27.
69. "My contention is that until a civil proceeding has placed a tract be-
yond the pale, no criminal prosecution should be sustained." Id. at 41.
70. [1962] A.C. 220 (1961).
71. The fact that solicitation by prostitutes in the street was forbidden
by the Street Offences Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 57, § 1, does not
mean that the defendant in Shaw had sufficient notice that his activity
was unlawful. One might reasonably conclude that the legislature
thought that public solicitation on the streets was offensive, but that
less intrusive solicitations, such as those contained in a ladies' direc-
tory, were not to be condemned.
72. [1973] A.C. 435 (1972).
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there is no jury it will depend upon the view which may be formed
by one particular judge, which might well differ from that which
would be formed by a different judge. In many cases there can
be no certainty as to what the decision will be. But none of this
is a reflection upon the law. Nor do I know of any procedure
under which someone could be told with precision just how far
he may go before he may incur some civil or some criminal liabil-
ity. Those who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign
which will denote the precise spot where they may fall in. So
when Parliament has made it an offence to publish an article which
may tend to deprave and corrupt and has left it to a jury to decide
whether an article may so tend it is no criticism of the law to
say that a man will not be sure in advance whether he will be
acquitted or convicted. Shaw's case is, therefore, not open to the
criticism that it created or tolerated a state of uncertainty. It mere-
ly affirmed with certainty that an offence was known to the law. 7 3
Presumably, in Lord Morris's view, because some uncertainty is
inevitable, one need not concern himself with the degree of
uncertainty.7 4
C. Toleration of Geographic Inconsistency
Reference already has been made to the absence of any require-
ment of geographic uniformity in the United States. This absence
is surprising when one considers that the Supreme Court has not
said, for example, that the fourth and fourteenth amendments'
requirements of "reasonable" searches and seizures are to vary
according to local concepts of reasonableness.7 5 On the other
hand, geographic diversity in at least some contexts is a tradi-
tional concomitant of federalism. 76
73. Id. at 463-64.
74. Lord Morris's reference to vagueness in suits for defamation is note-
worthy in that it suggests that vagueness problems are the same re-
gardless of whether the civil or criminal law is involved. Lord Morris
thus disregards the notion that the criminal law is distinguished from
the civil law in part because of the stigmatization resulting from con-
viction, which constitutes a finding of moral blameworthiness. See
P. BR=T, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT (1963). Lord Morris also
ignores a practical difference which usually distinguishes the civil
from the criminal law-the threat of physical incarceration associated
with the latter.
75. One could argue, however, that the Supreme Court is working in the
direction of local standards for the interpretation of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments, as a practical matter. This may be the effect
of Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
held that federal district courts were not to entertain habeas corpus
actions on behalf of persons convicted in state courts who were alleg-
ing violations of their fourth and fourteenth amendment rights, so long
as they had had a full and fair hearing on the merits in state courts.
76. The assumption that the substantive criminal law should remain in
the hands of the states, with a few exceptions essential to the main-
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As the United Kingdom is not a federal state, many Americans
may be surprised to learn of the extent of local differences in the
law of obscenity. For example, the Obscene Publications Acts of
1959 and 1964 are expressly inapplicable to Scotland and Northern
IrelandY' But even within England and Wales, local govern-
mental units have been permitted by statute to exercise independ-
ent licensing authority with respect to moving picture theatres and
the distribution of leaflets, for example.7 8 This is not a question
of different local interpretations of the same standard, but rather
the enforcement of potentially different standards.
A clearer case of similarity between the United States and
England, however, does relate to varying local interpretations of
the same general standard, e.g., that found in the Obscene Publica-
tions Act of 1959, as amended. As pointed out above, individual
juries apply the general language of these statutes with little guid-
ance from the trial judge. The phrase "tend to deprave or corrupt"
means whatever any particular jury thinks it means. Of course,
one jury determination has no binding effect on other juries, even
in the same locality.
Similarly, with forfeiture proceedings, there is not necessarily
any uniformity of decision among magistrates, although the advice
of the Director of Public Prosecutions usually is sought by the police
before they apply for a warrant.
D. Judicial Willingness to Let Personal Values
Affect Decision-Making
Usually it is assumed that courts in the United States are
characterized much more by "activism" than are their English
counterparts. Indeed, one finds some persons objecting to a Bill
of Rights for the United Kingdom on the ground that it would lead
to the sort of exercise of discretion in policy matters that is thought
to be typical of the United States Supreme Court. 79 An examina-
tenance of the federal system, is a common one. See, e.g., McClellan,
Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Fed-
eral Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663, 711-12. This assumption
has, however, come under criticism. See Davidow, One Justice
For All: A Proposal to Establish, by Federal Constitutional Amend-
ment, a National System of Criminal Justice, 51 N.C.L. REV. 259 (1972).
77. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 5(3); Obscene
Publications Act, 1964, c. 74, § 3 (3).
78. A good description of such local control is found in P. O'HIGGINs, supra
note 7, at 44-47, 78-80.
79. The contention that creation of a Bill of Rights for the United King-
dom would involve the judges too greatly in political matters is dis-
cussed in M. ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? 43-45 (1975).
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tion of the obscenity decisions of English courts and the United
States Supreme Court suggests, however, that, at least in this area,
the differences are not that great.
Examples of fairly clear policy decisions are not hard to find
in the Supreme Court's obscenity decisions. The exclusion of the
category of "obscenity" from the protection of the first and four-
teenth amendments was surely a policy decision of the first order.
The scanty history of obscenity prosecutions prior to the ratification
of the first amendment suggests that it was far from inevitable
that such an exception would be recognized.8 0 Even if history
more clearly had supported the treatment of "obscenity" as outside
constitutionally protected speech, the decision to adhere to this view
would still be an exercise of discretion on policy grounds; in a
number of other areas, such as desegregation 8 l and reapportion-
ment,8 2 the Court has not permitted historical arguments to stand
in its way. If the Court is sometimes willing to disregard history,
the decision to adhere to it in a particular context cannot be any-
thing other than an exercise of considerable discretion. Moreover,
the result in Miller, in which the Court continued to view obscenity
as beyond the constitutional pale, cannot be explained merely by
the presence on the Court of new justices who are not judicial
activists; after all, in the same term, with only one of the new
justices dissenting, the Court made a basic policy decision regard-
ing abortion, and in so doing rejected about 100 years of legal
history. 3
Additionally, by 1973, the Supreme Court's decisions in other
free speech areas had provided a standard for possible treatment
of sex-related materials. In the area of advocacy of violence the
Court had required, as a prerequisite to prosecution, a showing that
the advocacy was "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and [was] likely to produce such action. '8 4 Why
did the Court not apply the same test to sex-related materials8 5 -
80. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 3-6; Loewy, Abortive Reasons and
Obscene Standards: A Comment on the Abortion and Obscenity
Cases, 52 N.C.L. REV. 223, 235-36 (1973).
81. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964).
83. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Of the four justices appointed
by President Nixon, only Mr. Justice Rehnquest dissented.
84. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
85. See Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389(1950) (discussed in F. SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 32); Buchanan, Ob-
scenity and Brandenburg: The Missing Link? 11 Hous. L. REV. 537,
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requiring, for example, that they be shown to be directed at
producing rape, fornication, or adultery and likely to result in the
commission of these acts?8 6
Apart from the basic decision of whether to provide constitu-
tional protection for obscenity, the Supreme Court has also exer-
cised considerable discretion in attempting to define the concept.
How does one decide, for example, that certain books are not
obscene if they have "serious literary or artistic value" but are
obscene if they have value only as "entertainment?"87  Perhaps
the Court would say that "acceptable" entertainment has serious
570 (1974); Loewy, Free Speech: The "Missing Link" in the Law of
Obscenity, 16 J. PUB. L. 81, 82-90 (1967).
86. The question of the possible effect of exposure to "pornographic" ma-
terials is discussed at length in the REPORT OF THE COMrMISSION ON
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 139-243 (1970).. Dr. Victor B. Cline's
criticism of the Commission's use of some of the empirical data which
it generated is found in id. at 390-412. A review of both the Commis-
sion's findings and the critique by Dr. Cline is found in Yaffe, Research
Survey, PoaNOGPAPrY: THE LONGFORD REPORT 460-98 (1972). Yaffe
is critical of both the Commission and Cline. It is safe to conclude
on the basis of these materials that the empirical data neither prove
nor disprove that there is a causal link between exposure to pornogra-
phy and later undesirable actions on the part of those exposed.
It is true that the Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
pointed to at least one other value (besides the prevention of criminal
acts) which the state could properly promote through its obscenity
laws: the protection of "'the tone of society . . . and [the] quality
of life.'" 413 U.S. at 59. But concern with the moral tone of society
still does not justify a different treatment of "obscenity" from that
accorded advocacy of violent overthrow of the government. One who
advocates violent revolution or anarchy (but who does so in a context
in which his advocacy is "not directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to produce such action") can reason-
ably be thought to be adversely affecting the moral tone of society;
nevertheless, his speech is protected under the first amendment as con-
strued by the Supreme Court. See generally Barnett, Corruption and
Morals-The Underlying Issue of the Pornography Commission Re-
port, 1971 LAw AND Soc. ORD. 189; Henkin, Morals and the Constitu-
tion: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLum. L. REV. 391 (1963).
The notion that, in any event, the first amendment is irrelevant
to "pornography" because the latter does not involve the expression
of ideas, relied upon by the Supreme Court in Miller, 413 U.S. at 34-
35, ignores the communicative aspects of "showing" as well as "tell-
ing." Pornography can thus be seen as a statement of one person's
view of what constitutes a desirable lifestyle-presumably a matter
well within the range of first amendment protections. See Katz, Free
Discussion v. Final Decision: Moral and Artistic Controversy and the
Tropic of Cancer Trials, 79 YALE L.J. 209, 211, 215 (1969).
87. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031
(4th ed. 1975); Gellhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting Pictures, and Dread-
ful Laws, 8 GA. L. REV. 291, 298 (1974).
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literary or artistic value, but this still does not explain why the
Court chose to focus on "literary" or "artistic" value as opposed
to other possible categories, in formulating its test of obscenity.
A further example of the Supreme 'Court's implementation of
its own views of wise policy can be found in its decision to permit
the application of local standards. Clearly there is nothing in the
first and fourteenth amendments that suggests the propriety of
such standards. Even if one can find in federalism a justification
for differing standards in the interpretation of each state's own
laws, this clearly cannot justify the Court's decision in Hamling
v. United States"8 to permit juries in each federal district to apply
the community standards of that district in the enforcement of the
federal obscenity laws.8 9
88. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
89. At least since 1962 the accepted construction of amended
§ 1461 has been that of Mr. Justice Harlan and MR. JUSTICE
STEWART "that the proper test under this federal statute,
[§ 1461], reaching as it does all parts of the United States
whose population reflects many different ethnic and cultural
backgrounds, is a national standard of decency" . . . . Apart
from the questions whether the Court's new construction
trespasses upon the congressional prerogative . . . and
whether constitutionally any "local" standard under amended
§ 1461 can properly be employed to delineate the area of
expression protected by the First Amendment . . . since "[ilt
is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding," . . .
the construction that a "local" standard applies in § 1461 cases
raises at least another serious First Amendment problem.
The 1958 amendments to § 1461 constituted the mailing of
obscene matter a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237.
The practical effect of this amendment-intentionally
adopted by Congress for that express purpose-is to permit
prosecution "in the Federal district in which [the dissemi-
nator] mailed the obscenity, in the Federal district in which
the obscenity was received, or in any Federal district through
which the obscenity passed while it was on its route through
the mails." . . . Under today's "local" standards construc-
tion, therefore, the guilt or innocence of distributors of identi-
cal materials mailed from the same locale can now turn on the
chancy course of transit or place of delivery of the materials.
... National distributors choosing to send their products in
interstate travels will be forced to cope with the community
standards of every hamlet into which their goods may wan-
der. Because these variegated standards are impossible to
discern, national distributors, fearful of risking the expense
and difficulty of defending against prosecution in any of
several remote communities, must inevitably be led to retreat
to debilitating self-censorship that abridges the First Amend-
ment rights of the people.
Id. at 142-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
That Mr. Justice Brennan's fears have substance is illustrated by
the federal prosecution in Wichita, Kansas, of Al Goldstein for sending
Screw Magazine, published in New York City, through the mails. The
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Exercise of similar discretion is easy to detect in some of the
English obscenity decisions. Perhaps the clearest examples can be
found in the cases dealing with conspiracy to corrupt public morals:
Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions90 and Knuller Ltd. v.
Director of Public Prosecutions.9 1 Given the increasing willingness
of Parliament over the last 100 years to enact criminal laws cover-
ing a wide range of activities, the court very well might have ac-
cepted appellant's arguments in Shaw that it was for Parliament to
enact new offenses; 92 there was no "brooding omnipresence in the
sky"93 which dictated the recognition in 1961 of a common law of-
fense of conspiracy to corrupt public morals. Surely, apart from
any other consideration, there was no necessity for the court's con-
clusion that a conspiracy prosecution was not prevented by section
2(4) of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, which provides: "A
person publishing an article shall not be proceeded against for an
offense at common law consisting of the publication of any matter
contained or embodied in the article where it is of the essence of
the offense that the matter is obscene. ' 94  Reasonable men might
very well come to the conclusion that a charge of conspiracy to
corrupt public morals, based on an agreement to publish a directory
of prostitutes, was within the coverage of this section, especially
prosecution was made possible when postal authorities in Wichita or-
dered and received, through the mails, an issue of that magazine. None
of the approximately twelve regular subscribers in Wichita had com-
plained, and there were no newsstand sales of the magazine there.
See Dershowitz, Screwing Around With the First Amendment, PENT-
HOUsE, January, 1977, at 106, 142-43.
90. [1962] A.C.-220 (1961).
91. [1973] A.C. 435 (1972). Another dramatic example of the exercise
of broad discretion is found in John Calder Ltd. v. Powell, [1965] 1
Q.B. 509 (1964).
92. The argument was summarized in the opinion of the court in Shaw
when that case was heard before the Court of Criminal Appeal:
He [counsel] accepted for the purposes of his argument
the claim of the Court of King's Bench to be custos morum
but he contended that acting in that role the court had, so
to speak, from time to time declared particular conduct to
be an offence, thereby creating an offence rather than apply-
ing existing law to the particular facts. He went on to con-
tend that Parliament in the last 100 years had concerned
itself with legislation on issues of morality, decency and the
like, that such legislation must be taken to be in effect a
comprehensive code, and there is no longer any occasion for
the courts to create new offences in its capacity as custos
morum.
[1962] A.C. at 233.
93. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
94. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 2(4).
270 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 2 (1977)
because in this very case the defendant was also convicted of pub-
lishing an obscene article (the directory) in violation of section 2
of the same Act 9 5
The conclusion that at least some English judges are prepared
to incorporate their own views of wise policy into law need not
rest on inference. For instance, defending the majority view in
Shaw, Viscount Simonds said:
In the sphere of criminal law I entertain no doubt that there re-
mains in the courts of law a residual power to enforce the supreme
and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the
safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State, and that
it is their duty to guard it against attacks which may be the more
insidious because they are novel and unprepared for. That is the
broad head (call it public policy if you wish) within which the
present indictment falls. It matters little what label is given to
the offending act. To one of your Lordships it may appear an af-
front to public decency, to another considering that it may succeed
in its obvious intention of provoking libidinous desires it will seem
a corruption of public morals. Yet others may deem it aptly de-
scribed as the creation of a public mischief or the undermining
of moral conduct. The same act will not in all ages be regarded
in the same way. The law must be related to the changing stand-
ards of life, not yielding to every shifting impulse of the popular
will but having regard to fundamental assessments of human val-
ues and the purposes of society. Today a denial of the fundamental
Christian doctrine, which in past centuries would have been re-
garded by the ecclesiastical courts as heresy and by the common
law as blasphemy, will no longer be an offence if the decencies
of controversy are observed. When Lord Mansfield, speaking long
after the Star Chamber had been abolished, said that the Court
of King's Bench was the custos morum of the people and had the
superintendency of offences contra bonos mores, he was asserting,
as I now assert, that there is in that court a residual power, where
no statute has yet intervened to supersede the common law, to su-
perintend those offences which are prejudicial to the public wel-
fare. Such occasions will be rare, for Parliament has not been slow
to legislate when attention has been sufficiently aroused. But
gaps remain and will always remain since no one can foresee every
way in which the wickedness of man may disrupt the order of soci-
ety. Let me take a single instance to which my noble and learned
friend Lord Tucker refers. Let it be supposed that at some future,
perhaps early, date homosexual practices between adult consenting
males are no longer a crime. Would it not be an offence if even
without obscenity, such practices were publicly advocated and en-
couraged by pamphlet and advertisement? Or must we wait until
95. When Parliament was considering what came to be the 1964 Amend-
ment to the Obscene Publications Act, the Solicitor-General gave an
assurance that a charge of conspiracy to corrupt public morals would
not be used to circumvent the defense of public good under § 2(4)
of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959. Zellick, Films and the Law
of Obscenity, 1971 Cmv. L. REV. 126, 141-42.
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Parliament finds time to deal with such conduct? I say, my Lords,
that if the common law is powerless in such an event, then we
should no longer do her reverence. But I say that her hand is
still powerful and that it is for Her Majesty's judges to play the
part which Lord Mansfield pointed out to them.96
Knuller Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions tested Viscount
Simonds's theory about the ability of the courts to deal with pam-
phlets encouraging lawful homosexual activity. In the Sexual
Offences Act of 1967, 97 Parliament legalized private homosexual
acts between consenting adults. The defendant in Knuller pub-
lished a magazine which contained, among other things, advertise-
ments by homosexuals who were attempting to attract other homo-
sexuals for the purpose of engaging in homosexual acts. Again,
the prosecution resorted to the common law offense of conspiracy
to corrupt public morals. Again, the appeal against this count was
dismissed by the House of Lords. Despite the precedent of Shaw,
the court in Knuller still exercised considerable discretion in dis-
missing the appeal because by this time it had acknowledged its
power to overturn prior decisions.98 Indeed it was urged to over-
turn Shaw, but did not.99
Knuller thus demonstrated again an explicit judicial preference
for some values over other values. Certainty in the sense of con-
tinuity is preferred to certainty in the sense of fair notice to poten-
tial defendants. We already have provided a quotation from the
opinion of Lord Morris in Knuller, in which he exhibits an almost
total lack of concern with problems of providing adequate notice
of prohibited conduct.10 0 Despite indifference to this type of uncer-
tainty, however, Lord Morris expresses his view as to why Shaw
should not be overturned:
The result of this is that even had I not been of the view that
the decision in Shaw's case was as a decision correct, I would have
thought it wholly inappropriate now to review it under the freedom
expressed in the statement which was made in 1966 .... That
would be for the following reasons: (1) The decision constituted
a clear pronouncement of this House as to what the law was and
had been; (2) It was a decision in relation to the criminal law
where certainty is so desirable; (3) The decision has been acted
upon and many criminal prosecutions have been based upon the
authority of it; (4) The decision was one which attracted public
attention and which on different occasions has been brought par-
ticularly to the attention of Parliament; (5) Parliament has not
96. [1962] A.C. at 267-68.
97. Sexual Offences Act, 1967, c. 60, § 1.
98. Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.).
99. Only Lord Diplock would have overturned Shaw. [1973] A.C. at 469.
100. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
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altered the law; (6) Whether a change in the law could or could
not have been effected as part of the provisions of the Obscene
Publications Act 1964, or of the Sexual Offences Act 1967, or of
the Theatres Act 1968, is immaterial. The provisions and contents
of those Acts could well have stimulated an alteration of the law
as laid down in Shaw's case had Parliament so desired. 10 1
Thus, part of his argument is the need for "certainty," here
obviously meaning retention of the status quo. Continuous uncer-
tainty is, in Lord Morris's view, preferable to changeable certainty.
III. AREAS OF DIFFERENCE
A. Treatment of Violence and Drug-Taking
At least since Roth v. United States,0 2 as reaffirmed in Miller,
the concept of obscenity has been limited in the United States to
matters pertaining to sex, whereas no such limitation exists in
England.1 0 3 In Director of Public Prosecutions v. A. & B.C. Chew-
ing Gum Ltd., 0 4 for example, the allegedly obscene materials
were bubble gum "battle cards" designed for children, which ap-
parently depicted scenes of violence. In The Queen v. Calder &
Boyars Ltd.'0 5 the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, said, in dis-
cussing the application of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959 to
Hubert Selby Jr.'s book, Last Exit to Brooklyn: "The depravity and
corruption may also take various forms. It may be to induce erotic
desires of a heterosexual kind or to promote homosexuality or other
sexual perversions or drug-taking or brutal violence."' 0 6
Despite this seemingly clear distinction between English and
American law, we note that occasionally some justices of the United
States Supreme Court have had some difficulty in adhering to the
notion that obscenity involves an "appeal to the prurient interest
in sex.' 0 7 For example, several justices, including the author of
the Miller majority opinion, have used the word "obscene" to
describe the use of the adjective "mother fucking" in contexts in
which it was clear that there were no sexual denotations or conno-
tations. In one case, for example, the expression was employed by
a speaker as a term of derision and applied to "teachers, the
101. [1973] A.C. at 466.
102. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
103. The earliest case applying the concept of obscenity to non-sexual ma-
terials is John Calder Ltd. v. Powell, [1965] 1 Q.B. 509 (1964).
104. [1968] 1 Q.B. 159 (1967).
105. [1969] 1 Q.B. 151 (C.A. 1968).
106. Id. at 172.
107. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24.
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community, the school system, the school board, the country, the
county, and the town."' 0 8
B. Greater Protection of the Expression of Ideas Relating
to Sexual Matters in the United States
As the United States Constitution explicitly protects freedom
of speech,10 9 it is more likely that material which clearly advo-
cates ideas or views about sexual behavior, even though contrary
to prevalent moral standards and religious precepts, will be safe-
guarded in the United States. For example, in Kingsley Inter-
national Pictures Corp. v. Regents,1 0 the Supreme Court set aside
state efforts to suppress a movie which advocated the idea that
adultery may be proper behavior."' In contrast to this, in
England unpopular ideas concerning sexuality and even parental
and political authority have been held to be obscene. The recent
case of The Queen v. Handyside (Little Red School Book)," 2
which is presently the subject of a complaint before the European
Commission on Human Rights in Strasbourg, affords a good
example. The report of the European Commission in Handyside
states that the United Kingdom Government proffered, inter alia,
the following reasons for finding the Little Red School Book objec-
tionable: (1) It is intended to undermine respect for marriage as
a social institution. (2) A passage in the book dealing with "inter-
course and petting" contains no injunction about exercising re-
straint in sexual matters. (3) The undesirable effects of the book
are increased by the fact that its anti-authoritarian stance and hos-
tile atitude to the teacher/child relationship tend to remove the
restraining influences that otherwise might operate to minimize
harmful tendencies which are likely to deprave and corrupt." 3
108. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 909, 910-11 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
109. See note 6 supra.
110. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
111. Cf. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (newspaper account, charg-
ing police harassment in the arrest of a newspaper staff member on
a charge of possession of obscene matter, accompanied by pertinent
photographs, held constitutionally protected).
The present Court has suggested a distinction between "ideas of
social and political significance" and "material that is on the border-
line between pornography and artistic expression." Young v. Amer-
ican Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976).
112. Unreported Case, Inner London Quarter Sessions, October 29, 1971.
113. APPLICATION No. 5493/72, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION [adopted Sep-
tember 30, 1975] 79. The Commission itself has referred the case to
the European Court of Human Rights.
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Clearly under present United States law these passages of the
book, although unconventional and perhaps immoral, would fall on
the protected side of the margin.
C. Willingness to Find Certain Material Not Obscene
as a Matter of Law
In Jenkins v. Georgia 14 the United States Supreme Court
made clear that, despite its "new," "concrete" guidelines announced
in Miller (which were to enable juries to proceed with confidence),
the Court is still willing to "second-guess" local courts and juries
and find that some items cannot be suppressed constitutionally on
grounds of obscenity.11,5 Thus, although the Miller test is vague,
we know at least that the movie "Carnal Knowledge" is not
obscene. Perhaps some-but not all-of the uncertainty in this
area is removed in the case of movies which are "comparable" to
"Carnal Knowledge." Presumably, movies dealing with sex in
which "the camera does not focus on the bodies of the actors" when
"sexual conduct including 'ultimate sexual acts' is understood to
be taking place" 1 6 are constitutionally protected. The status of
many of those items found to be constitutionally protected prior
to Miller, however, is not at all clear.117
114. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
115. Citations to 31 cases decided after Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966), but before Miller in which the Supreme Court reversed
obscenity convictions in per curiam decisions (in which, of necessity,
the holding was that the material found to be obscene at trial could
not constitutionally be proscribed) are collected in Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
at 82-83 n.8.
On at least two recent occasions, Mr. Justice Brennan has, in dis-
senting from denials of certiorari, accused the majority of not fulfilling
its obligation to apply the constitutional standard to material which
has been suppressed by states. Matheny v. Alabama, 425 U.S. 982
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pendleton v. California, 423 U.S. 1068
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. 418 U.S. at 161.
117. In the light of Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973), in which
the Court made clear the possible application of the Miller test to
books without pictures, the status of John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure is unclear. The plurality in Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), did not find the book constitutionally pro-
tected; rather, the basis of the plurality opinion was that the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts had improperly applied the "redeem-
ing social value" prong of the test for obscenity. The Massachusetts
court had apparently assumed, at least for the sake of argument, that
Cleland's book had some social importance. The Supreme Court did
not have to review this factual assumption, in the light of the state
court's error in the application of the obscenity test. Even if the Su-
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Of course, this willingness to review exacts institutional costs,
as noted by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissent in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton:
These problems concern the institutional stress that inevitably
results where the line separating protected from unprotected speech
is excessively vague. In Roth we conceded that "there may be
marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the
line on which a particular fact situation falls. . ....
... Our subsequent experience demonstrates that almost every
case is "marginal." And since the "margin" marks the point of
separation between protected and unprotected speech, we are left
with a system in which almost every obscenity case presents a con-
stitutional question of exceptional difficulty."18
The English cases provide little guidance of the sort provided
by Jenkins, because, with possibly one or two exceptions, the
English judges have not declared matters not obscene as a matter
of law under the Obscene Publications Act. In The Queen v.
Calder & Boyars Ltd.,1 9 for example, the Court of Appeal,
Criminal Division, quashed the conviction of certain publishers for
having published Hubert Selby, Jr.'s book, Last Exit to Brooklyn.
The court did so because of the trial court's failure properly to
instruct the jury concerning the appellant's defense that the book,
far from depraving, treated the questionable matter (violence and
drug-taking) in such a way that the reader would be revolted by
it and not encouraged to engage in such activities. However, the
court refused to say that the book was not obscene as a matter
of law, despite its own acknowledgment that the book had been
"favourably reviewed in the U.S.A. by a number of eminent
critics," that it had been "most favourably received by many distin-
guished British critics," and that "no one has ever suggested that
this is not a serious book or that appellants did not genuinely
believe that it ought to be published in the interest of litera-
ture.' 20 The court viewed its role as a limited one:
We have been told by both sides that this case is one of the
greatest importance. Indeed, it has been said on behalf of the ap-
pellants that the determination of this appeal may affect the whole
future of literature and the right to free speech in this country.
This court does not, however, propose to express any opinion
whether this book or books like it are obscene; still less, whether
preme Court assumed that Cleland's book was protected under the
test announced in Memoirs, it is not certain that the Court would now
overturn a jury determination that the book lacked "serious" literary
or artistic value. See note 115 supra.
118. 413 U.S. at 91.
119. [1969] 1 Q.B. 151 (C.A. 1968).
120. Id. at 165.
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their publication is justified as being for the public good. These
questions are not for this court to decide; they are wholly within
the province of a jury. On an indictment under s. 2(1) of the
Act of 1959 it is for the jury alone-representing the body of ordi-
nary citizens-to decide these difficult questions after having had
a proper direction on the law and an adequate summing-up of the
case for the Crown and for the defence. The only question for
us to decide is whether the criticisms, which have been so skilfully
made by counsel for the appellants, of the learned judge's direction
and summing-up to the jury are justified, and if so, whether the
convictions can be allowed to stand. 121
One could infer from this that the court would never rule some-
thing beyond the reach of the Obscene Publications Act as a matter
of law. After all, if the court were willing to say in Calder &
Boyars that admittedly serious literature was not, as a matter of
law, "justified as being for the public good,' 1 2 2 it is difficult to
imagine a case in which the court would upset the verdict of a prop-
erly instructed jury. Of course, it must be remembered that the
court did quash the conviction in this case, albeit for mere instruc-
tional error; thus, the court's declaration of its role was dictum.
There is one case in which Queen's Bench Division judges,
hearing an appeal from magistrates in a forfeiture proceeding,
indicated that some materials were obscene as a matter of law,
and some not obscene as a matter of law. In Burke v. Copper 23
some magistrates had found 123 photographs and prints obscene and
ordered their forfeiture, but had come to a contrary conclusion
regarding some other photographs. On appeal the court sent the
case back with directions to order the forfeiture of all photographs
except a few which "on any conceivable view could be said to have
any artistic merit or to provide any message or inspiration."' 124
As the court made no effort to describe the differences between
those finally ordered forfeited and those exempted from forfei-
ture, 25 this case, unlike Jenkins v. Georgia, can provide no guid-
ance to those seeking to understand the differences between legal
obscenity and non-obscenity.
D. Burden of Proof
As indicated above, the question whether a publication is of
literary or other worth such as to justify publication under the
121. Id. at 166.
122. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 4(1).
123. [1962] 1 W.L.R. 700 (Q.B.).
124. Id. at 705-06.
125. Indeed the court relied upon the prosecution to decide which pictures
"on any conceivable view could be said to have any artistic merit
or to provide any message or inspiration." Id. at 706.
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the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, as amended, is a matter to be
raised in defense. The defendant's burden is not merely to go for-
ward with the evidence, but rather to "make out [his] defense
under this section on a balance of probabilities."'126 This is
clearly different from the situation under Miller which requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the
offense, including lack of "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."
The situation in civil cases in the United States is not so clear.
That the burden is still upon the person seeking to suppress
allegedly obscene materials is indicated by the Supreme Court's
holdings in Freedman v. Maryland127 and Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad,128 in which the Court struck down censor-
ship schemes which failed to meet, inter alia, the following require-
ment: "First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and
of proving that the material is unprotected, must rest on the
censor."' 29  This may be thought to settle the issue, but some
doubt is raised by McKinney v. Alabama.130 The defendant in
McKinney was not allowed to raise the issue of obscenity at his
state criminal trial, because, in a previous civil action to which the
defendant had not been a party, an Alabama court had declared
obscene a magazine which the defendant later possessed with
knowledge of the court's civil determination of obscenity. In strik-
ing down this procedure, the Supreme Court referred to the defi-
ciencies in such ambiguous language (for example, that the defend-
ant had had "no opportunity to be heard" on the obscenity issue),
that Mr. Justice Blackmun was moved to concur in part as follows:
I concur in the judgment of the Court and I join its opinion
on the assumption that the Court is not deciding either of the fol-
lowing propositions:
2. Whether a system which merely allows one to initiate a chal-
lenge to an ex parte determination of obscenity is constitutionally
proper. I take it that the full paragraph on page 1193 of the Court's
opinion does not resolve that question. If it does, I refrain fromjoining it. I had believed, in this connection, that it is settled that
the burden of proving that a particular expression is unprotected
rests on the censor ... and is not to be shifted to the other side
by a mere "avenue for initiating a challenge."'131
126. The Queen v. Calder & Boyars Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. 151, 117 (C.A.
1968).
127. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
128. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
129. Id. at 560.
130. 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
131. Id. at 677-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
278 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 2 (1977)
E. Handling of Expert Testimony
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that it is
not "error to fail to require 'expert' affirmative evidence that the
materials [are] obscene when the materials themselves [are]
actually placed in evidence" and that such materials "are the best
evidence of what they represent.' 1 32  The following language,
taken from a footnote to that quotation, is pertinent:
This is not a subject that lends itself to the traditional use of
expert testimony. Such testimony is usually admitted for the pur-
pose of explaining to lay jurors what they otherwise could not un-
derstand .... No such assistance is needed by jurors in obscenity
cases; indeed the "expert witness" practices employed in these
cases have often made a mockery out of the otherwise sound con-
cept of expert testimony..... "Simply stated, hard core pornogra-
phy . . . can and does speak for itself." United States v. Wild,
422 F.2d 34, 36 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971). We
reserve judgment, however, on the extreme case, not presented
here, where contested materials are directed at such a bizarre devi-
ant group that the experience of the trier of fact would be plainly
inadequate to judge whether the material appeals to the prurient
interest. 38
One might conclude from this footnote that such evidence could
also be excluded in the discretion of the trial court from both the
prosecution and defense cases. After all, if it is not necessary, can
it not be excluded? This possibility is suggested by the Court's
discussion of the exclusion of certain expert testimony in Hamling
v. United States.3 4  The trial court excluded the testimony
because it related to a local rather than national standard; at the
time of the trial the trial court assumed that the national standard
was pertinent. On review, the question was raised whether the
defendant should have had a chance to introduce expert testimony
as to the local standard in view of the Court's conclusion in Ham-
ling that the local standard was applicable. In rejecting this con-
tention, the Court said in part: "As we have noted, . . the District
Court has wide discretion in its determination to admit and exclude
evidence, and this is particularly true in the case of expert
testimony.' ' 35
Before one leaps to the conclusion that this means that all expert
testimony can be excluded, it ought to be noted that in Hamling
the trial judge permitted four other experts to testify. Further-
more there is language in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
132. 413 U.S. at 56.
133. Id. at 56 n.6.
134. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
135. Id. at 108.
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opinion in the earlier case of Smith v. California'3 6 which suggests
a contrary conclusion:
Since the law through its functionaries is "applying contempo-
rary community standards" in determining what constitutes ob-
scenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489, it surely must
be deemed rational, and therefore relevant to the issue of obscenity,
to allow light to be shed on what those "contemporary community
standards" are. Their interpretation ought not to depend solely
on the necessarily limited, hit-or-miss, subjective view of what they
are believed to be by the individual juror or judge. It bears repe-
tition that the determination of obscenity is for juror or judge not
on the basis of his personal upbringing or restricted reflection or
particular experience of life, but on the basis of "contemporary
community standards." Can it be doubted that there is a great
difference in what is to be deemed obscene in 1959 compared with
what was deemed obscene in 1859? . . . Unless we disbelieve that
the literary, psychological or moral standards of a community can
be made fruitful and illuminating subjects of inquiry by those who
give their life to such inquiries, it was violative of "due process"
to exclude the constitutionally relevant evidence proffered in this
case.137
The Court in Kaplan v. California3 8 spoke approvingly, in
dictum, of the Frankfurter approach.
Under the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, expert evidence is
admissible, but only as to the defense of public good. The trial
court is supposed to exclude such testimony with regard to the
tendency to deprave and corrupt. 3 9 The Post Office Act of 1953,
which does not have a section equivalent to section 4(2) of the
Obscene Publications Act, has been interpreted to preclude the
admission of evidence from "persons of standing or repute" as to
what effect allegedly "indecent" materials had on them.
140
An exception to the principle that expert testimony is not
admissible regarding the question of corruption or depravity is
found in Director of Public Prosecutions v. A. & B.C. Chewing Gum
Ltd., 41 in which the court held it improper for the magistrates
at trial to have excluded expert psychiatric testimony, tendered by
the prosecution, regarding the effect of certain "battle cards" on
children of various ages.
136. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
137. Id. at 165-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
138. 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
139. The Queen v. Calder & Boyars Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. 151, 171 (C.A.
1968) (dictum); The Queen v. Anderson, [1972] 1 Q.B. 304, 313 (C.A.
1971) (dictum).
140. The Queen v. Stamford, [1972] 2 Q.B. 391, 395 (C.A.).
141. [1968] 1 Q.B. 159 (1967).
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Thus, apart from a case involving alleged corruption of children,
it is clear that an English court does not even have discretion to
admit expert testimony until the defendant tries to establish the
defense of public good. Moreover, even with regard to the defense
of public good, the availability of expert testimony may be more
limited than might appear at first glance. In The Queen v. Stani-
forth, 42 the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that it was
not error for the trial judge to have excluded expert testimony that
the allegedly obscene materials (supposedly "hard pornography")
were of therapeutic value to the "sexually repressed or perverted
or deviant.'1 43 In the court's view, admission of such testimony
would have been inconsistent with the Act because the presupposi-
tion of such testimony was that all pornography was of benefit to
the public.144
F. Procedure for Seizure of Allegedly Obscene Material
Section 3 of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959 provides in
part:
(1) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath
that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that, in any premises
in the petty sessions area for which he acts, or on any stall or
vehicle in that area, being premises or a stall or vehicle specified
in the information, obscene articles are, or are from time to time,
kept for publication for gain, the justice may issue a warrant under
his hand empowering any constable to enter (if need be by force)
and search the premises, or to search the stall or vehicle, within
fourteen days from the date of the warrant, and to seize and re-
move any articles found therein or thereon which the constable
has reason to believe to be obscene articles and to be kept for pub-
lication for gain.
(2) A warrant under the foregoing subsection shall, if any ob-
scene articles are seized under the warrant, also empower the
seizure and removal of any documents found in the premises or,
as the case may be, on the stall or vehicle which relate to a trade
or business carried on at the premises or from the stall or vehicle.
(3) Any articles seized under subsection (1) of this section
shall be brought before a justice of the peace acting for the same
142. [1976] 2 W.L.R. 849 (C.A.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Jordon, [1976] 3 All E.R. 775 (H.L.).
143. Id. at 854.
144. The nature of the expert testimony tendered at trial illustrates the
proposition that people today simply disagree about the sort of mate-
rial that should be made generally available. See note 167 infra. The
problem is not only that people disagree about what constitutes "ob-
scenity," but also that some people simply do not accept the concept
of obscenity at all. In other words, they do not believe that the
government has any business telling them what they may or may not
read or see in the movies.
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petty sessions areas as the justice who issued the warrant, and thejustice before whom the articles are brought may thereupon issue
a summons to the occupier of the premises or, as the case may
be, the user of the stall or vehicle to appear on a day specified in
the summons before a magistrates' court for that petty sessions area
to show cause why the articles or any of them should not be for-
feited; and if the court is satisfied, as respects any of the articles,
that at the time when they were seized they were obscene articles
kept for publication for gain, the court shall order those articles
to be forfeited: . . .145
Thus, although the original determination to search must be made
by the magistrate, the determination of which items are to be seized
is left to the constable executing the warrant. Moreover, the con-
stable is empowered to seize, not just a single copy of an allegedly
obscene item, but presumably all such copies. Futhermore, under
subsection (2), if allegedly obscene items are seized, the business
records of the establishment being searched also can be seized.
Thereafter there is supposed to be a hearing before a Justice of
the Peace to determine whether the allegedly obscene items are
obscene and thus to be forfeited. 146
In the United States, on the other hand, massive seizures of
books prior to a judicial determination of obscenity are forbid-
den.14 7 No seizure is possible without a warrant, and the issuing
magistrate cannot rely on conclusory assertions of obscenity by a
policeman.148  (Presumably the magistrate has to read the publi-
cations himself before issuing the warrant; it is not clear whether
he has to see a movie himself before issuing a warrant.) As the
seizure at this point is justified merely as an effort to secure evi-
dence for a prompt judicial hearing on the issue of obscenity, the
Supreme Court has said that, pending the hearing, the exhibitor
of a film should be given an opportunity to copy the seized motion
picture if the exhibitor does not have access to other copies. 149
G. Procedural Differences not Peculiar to
Obscenity Prosecutions
In most cases summarily tried before a magistrate under section
145. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 3.
146. As it perhaps too frequently happens, theory and practice here di-
verge. "In many cases the police do not take the matter to the court.
They caution the occupier and invite him to sign a 'disclaimer' dis-
claiming any interest in the material. They then destroy it." The
Queen v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [1973] Q.B. 241,
251 (C.A. 1972).
147. See A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
148. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Marcus v. Search War-
rant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
149. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492-93 (dictum).
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2(1) (a) of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, as amended, a judg-
ment of acquittal can be appealed by the prosecution with respect
to matters of law but not findings of fact.150 In Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions v. Whyte,15' the House of Lords allowed an
appeal from what was, in effect, an acquittal by the trial magis-
trates. The court's justification for directing a conviction on
remand was that the magistrates, who had heard all the evidence
on both sides, had erroneously assumed that the likely readers of
the allegedly obscene materials were incapable of further corrup-
tion. Dissenting, Lord Salmon believed that the majority's decision
"turn[ed] entirely on their view of the facts. No point of law
ar [ose] .,152
Clearly such a result would be impossible in the United States
under the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment, 153
as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
5 4
Another area where procedures vary is jury selection. Voir dire
tends to be much more extensive in the United States, as illustrated
by the lengthy voir dire in the recent case of Joan Little, 55 but
the extent to which such practices are constitutionally protected
is not clear. 56
IV. CONCLUSION
The major substantive difference in the treatment of obscenity
in the United States and in England and Wales is that in England
and Wales the notion of obscenity is not restricted to sex, but can
include violence and drug-taking. It also is possible to point to
other substantive differences, at least with respect to the Post
Office Act of 1953 and the common law offenses of conspiracy to
150. See note 44 supra.
151. [1972] A.C. 849.
152. Id. at 876.
153. "No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... .
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
154. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
155. See Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Nov. 23, 1975, § F, at 1, col. 1.
156. Although the Supreme Court held in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.
524 (1973), that under the facts of that case, it was a denial of due
process for the trial court to refuse to permit an inquiry into possible
racial bias on the part of jurors, the Court in Ristaino v. Ross, 424
U.S. 589 (1976), refused to extend the holding of Ham to every situa-
tion in which the defendant is black and the victim white. On the
other hand, the Court's discussion of the problem of pretrial publicity
in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976), suggests
that the Court is willing in appropriate cases to recognize a constitu-
tional requirement of extensive voir dire examination. Id. at 2805.
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corrupt public morals and to outrage public decency, against which
there is no defense of public good based upon the need to serve
literature and the arts. In the light of the considerable vagueness
of such concepts as "obscenity," "public decency" and "public good,"
one may question whether these latter substantive differences are
as great as they first might appear.
The fact that "obscenity" is restricted to sexual matters in the
United States, but is not so restricted in England and Wales, high-
lights the different approaches taken by the courts in the two coun-
tries resulting from the existence of a written Bill of Rights in the
United States and the absence of such a Bill of Rights in England.
The prohibition of "obscenity" in the United States has developed
as an exception to otherwise constitutionally protected activity.1 7
Because there is explicit protection of freedom of speech in the
United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has
provided some protection for the more obvious expressions of sex-
related ideas, as illustrated by Kingsley International Pictures
Corp. v. Regents.158 The Handyside'59 case illustrates that less
protection of this sort is provided in England and Wales.
Other major differences between the United States and England
and Wales are of a procedural sort, but nevertheless may have sub-
stantive effects. For example, the willingness of the United States
Supreme Court to declare certain materials not obscene as a matter
of constitutional law may give some-though perhaps not much-
guidance to distributors of potentially obscene materials in the
United States by somewhat narrowing the offense of obscenity as
actually administered. 160 The fact that the burden of proof is
on the prosecution in the United States to prove an absence of
serious literary or similar value again may make it a little more
difficult for the prosecution to succeed there. Thus, the protected
area may be a little broader in the United States than it is in
England, where the defendant bears the burden of justifying
material which might otherwise be said to tend to deprave or
corrupt. Similarly, because the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment precludes appeals from what are in effect acquit-
tals in the lower court, there is slightly less likelihood that a pub-
lisher will be prosecuted successfully in the United States.
157. It was not ineyitable, of course, that obscenity would be limited to
sexual matters, but the development of general first amendment prin-
ciples has prevented the easy judicial expansion of the notion of ob-
scenity which has characterized some English decisions.
158. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
159. See note 112 supra.
160. This practice, however, has its institutional costs. See note 118 and
accompanying text supra.
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As indicated above, given the generality of the first amend-
ment's treatment of speech, it was not inevitable that the Supreme
Court would develop the notion of obscenity as an exception. Thus
it would have been difficult to predict, simply on the basis of a
written constitution in the United States, that the substantive laws
in England and Wales and in the United States dealing with
obscenity would become as similar as they indeed have become. On
the other hand, to the extent that substantial differences exist as
a result of procedural differences, these differences might have been
a little easier to predict in view of the concern with procedural
regularity which is manifested in the American Bill of Rights.
Perhaps one can generalize and say that adherence to procedural
requirements will have a limiting impact on attempted intrusions
into areas which, according to some people, ought to be kept free
from governmental interference.' 8 '
We cannot leave the subject of obscenity without alluding to
a common source of difficulty which has plagued courts in both
United States and England-a difficulty which we mentioned in
the Introduction and touched upon in our discussion of the problem
of vagueness. The problem lies in the lack of consensus, in a
pluralistic society, regarding acceptable treatment of sexual mat-
ters. Despite such a lack of consensus, our legal systems have
continued the tradition of insisting that "obscene" materials be pro-
scribed. Thus, the attempt to describe what sort of material is
"obscene," utilizing either the "deprave and corrupt" formula or
the three-pronged Miller test, is founded on the fiction that a social
consensus exists and readily can be identified. The Court of
Appeal, Criminal Division, recognized this recently:
The difficulty, which becomes ever increasingly apparent, is to
know what is the current view of society. In times past there was
probably a general consensus of opinion on the subject, but almost
certainly there is none today. Not only in books and magazines
on sale at every bookstall and newsagent's shop, but on stage and
screen as well, society appears to tolerate a degree of sexual can-
dour which has already invaded a large area considered until re-
cently to lie within the forbidden territory of the obscene.162
In England this contradiction between the lack of social consen-
sus and the assumption of social consensus is both reflected and
entrenched in the unelaborated statutory "deprave and corrupt"
161. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARv. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958).
162. The Queen v. Staniforth, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 849, 855-56 (C.A.), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordon, [1976]
3 All. E.R. 775 (H.L.).
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formula, which fails to articulate the specific harm that the obscen-
ity law is designed to combat. It is reflected further in the inter-
pretation by the courts that juries are to decide whether an article
"depraves or corrupts" as a question of fact without any psychologi-
cal, sociological, or medical advice.
The result is, to use Lord Denning's phrase, that the law has
"misfired."' 63  The 1959 and 1964 English Acts are not reducing
the amount of obscene material available. The police refrain from
prosecuting because under the "deprave and corrupt" formula there
is no assurance of a conviction, and attempts at prosecution either
fail or result in slight penalties. Furthermore, as Lord Denning
succinctly put it in The Queen v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis: 164
That test can be used skilfully to obtain an acquittal by this
piece of sophistry: if the likely readers are those who are already
depraved and corrupt, this item will not make them more so: but
if the likely readers are just ordinary sort of folk, they will be
so revolted that they will be turned away from it.165
In the United States, the contradiction asserts itself partly in
the disagreements among members of the Supreme Court as to
whether a particular article is obscene.'6 6 The Supreme Court's
approval of the use of a state-wide standard in Miller and a district-
wide standard in Hamling is, arguably, a partial recognition of the
163. The Queen v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [1973] Q.B.
241, 250 (C.A. 1972).
164. [1973] Q.B. 241 (C.A. 1972).
165. Id. at 251. Lord Denning's views appear, at first glance, to be incon-
sistent with the result reached in the earlier case of Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Whyte, [1972] A.C. 849. In Whyte, it will be recalled,
an acquittal by the Magistrates was overturned by the House of Lords
on the ground that the Magistrates had assumed erroneously that the
readers of certain materials already were corrupted and hence incapa-
ble of being corrupted further. Lord Denning seems to be suggesting
in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, however, that a jury is
free to find that an individual is so debased that he cannot be cor-
rupted further or that defense counsel can argue this to the jury. Be-
cause Whyte did not deal with a jury trial, the issues raised by Den-
ning were not considered in Whyte. Perhaps, therefore, Lord Denning
is correct as to juries, as distinguished from Magistrates. That differ-
ent standards may, as a practical matter, apply to juries and Mag-
istrates may seem strange to Americans, but it must be remembered
that acquittals by Magistrates can be appealed sometimes in England,
whereas the same is not true with respect to jury verdicts. See note
44 supra.
166. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 441 (1966) (Clark,
J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 497 (1966)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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lack of consensus. It is only a partial recognition of the problem
because it fails to take into account the lack of consensus within
the local communities. 107 A price is paid for this partial recogni-
tion: exacerbation of the problem of fair notice, at least with
respect to state-wide and national publishers. 1 8
One of the best expressions of the problem in the United States
is found in Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton:
Art and literature reflect tastes; and tastes, like musical ap-
preciation, are hardly reducible to precise definitions. That is one
reason I have always felt that "obscenity" was not an exception
to the First Amendment. For matters of taste, like matters of be-
lief, turn on the idiosyncracies of individuals. They are too per-
sonal to define and too emotional and vague to apply .... 169
It is clear that the laws in both the United States and England
and Wales have failed to resolve the difficulty inherent in a lack
of consensus regarding obscenity. The justification for obscenity
laws thus needs to be reexamined in the light of the costs of the
present enforcement of such laws: imposition of substantial
burdens on the appellate process (at least in the United States),
violation of the principle of fair notice in criminal cases, and
encouragement of self-censorship.
167. For example, a study of attitudes towards sex-related materials in the
metropolitan area of Detroit showed substantial differences of opinion
among those surveyed. See Wallace, Wuehmer, & Podany, Contempo-
rary Community Standards of Visual Erotica, 9 TECH. REP. OF THE COM-
MISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 27. Even among college
students, who are often thought to have attitudes different from the
rest of the community, there appears to be substantial disagree-
ment as to what, if anything, constitutes "pornography." See White
& Barnet, College Students Attitudes on Pornography, 1 TECH. REP.
OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 181.
168. Moreover, the move toward local standards is a decentralization rem-
iniscent of feudal society.
169. 413 U.S. at 70.
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Appendix
For a history of obscenity from antiquity see N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS,
OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956). A good history of the develop-
ment of obscenity in England is found in D. THOMAS, A LONG TIME
BURNING (1969). A brief history of the development of the law of
obscenity in England is also found in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 428-29 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring). The situation in
the American colonies before ratification of the Constitution is re-
counted briefly in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957).
Prior to 1727, jurisdiction over obscenity was exercised in
England by the ecclesiastical courts. The first successful prosecu-
tion of obscenity in the Court of King's Bench occurred in Dominus
Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727).
The historical origin of the modern legal test of obscenity in
both the United States and England is found in The Queen v.
Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, in which Lord Chief Justice Cockburn
enunciated the following test in interpreting the word "obscene"
as used in An Act For More Effectually Preventing the Sale of
Obscene Books, Pictures, Prints, and Other Articles, 1857, 20 & 21
Vict., c. 83, § 1: "[A]nd I think the test of obscenity is this,
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall." [1868] 3 Q.B. at 371.
In England and Wales, the basic concept of obscenity, as enunci-
ated in Hicklin, has been carried forward in the Obscene Publica-
tions Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 1. See note 29, and accom-
panying text supra.
In the United States, the Supreme Court did not make clear the
status of obscenity laws under the Constitution until Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), in which it held a federal statute pro-
hibiting the mailing of obscene matter constitutional, since "obscen-
ity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." Id. at 485. The Court in Roth defined obscene material as
"material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest." Id. at 487.
The Roth test was modified in a plurality opinion in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), in which the following test
was enunciated:
Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three
elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest in sex; (b) material is patently offensive because it af-
fronts contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.
288 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 2 (1977)
Id. at 418. Admittedly, this was a plurality opinion, but since
Justices Black and Douglas, who concurred in the judgment,
opposed any laws which punished "obscenity," it is clear that five
justices were willing to go at least as far as the plurality in protec-
ting sex-related materials from suppression by the states.
The current American test is found in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973), discussed in the text of this article.
